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Abstract—While there are various methods to detect applica-
tion layer attacks or intrusion attempts on an individual end host,
it is not efficient to provide all end hosts in the network with
heavy-duty defense systems or software firewalls. In this work, we
leverage a new concept of programmable data planes, to directly
react on alerts raised by a victim and prevent further attacks
on the whole network by blocking the attack at the network
edge. We call our design LAMP, Layer 7 Attack Mitigation with
Programmable data planes. We implemented LAMP using the P4
data plane programming language and evaluated its effectiveness
and efficiency in the Behavioral Model (bmv2) environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Layer 7 attacks target the resources of the application layer,
such as web and database servers. A victim of Layer 7
attack might be a data center, a cloud service or a private
network. There are multiple scenarios where Layer 7 attacks
can disrupt the services provided by a network. For example, a
DDoS attack known as HTTP flood exhausts web servers and
databases of a network by sending a great amount of POST
or GET requests. The attack can be reinforced, when it is
conducted by large botnets, i.e., a network of compromised
devices controlled by an attacker. IoT (Internet of Things)
devices are the most attractive victims to be lured into botnets,
because of various security flaws. In particular, most often
the users of IoT devices do not change the default login and
password embedded by the manufacturer, which makes the
IoT devices vulnerable to dictionary attacks [1]. Moreover,
IoT devices possess limited CPU resources for identifying a
malicious user or an intrusion attempt [2].
The number of attacks at the application layer is growing,
according to the ”Global DDoS Threat Landscape Report” [3].
Current detection techniques for application layer attacks
include wide range of measures including (1) Pattern analysis
of HTTP requests; (2) Browsing behavior analysis using web
logs; (3) Geo-location analysis of web clients; (4) Machine
learning pre-profiling legitimate traffic; (5) Application layer
challenges, such as as CAPTCHA; (6) JavaScript engine
authentication and many others ([4], [5], [6], [7], [8]). All of
these techniques require application data analysis with high
computational capabilities, which are usually available at the
powerful end hosts. Upon detection, the malicious traffic can
be dropped based on their source IP addresses or other at-
tributes, such as TCP/UDP ports or HTTP request information.
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Normally, there are two ways to achieve this goal with the
help of a victim end host. The first one is individual or local
defense, where the machine running the application installs
certain firewall/IDS rules to block the attack traffic. One of
the main drawbacks of this approach is that the identified
attacking information cannot be re-used by other end hosts
in the same network. The second approach is cooperative or
global defense, where a Software Defined Networking (SDN)
controller can be used to collect the detection results and to
install the corresponding OpenFlow-like rules to SDN-enabled
switches. However, in this case, an SDN controller introduces
additional complexity and overhead to the network operations.
In addition, security of the SDN controller itself is another
concern.
To enable prompt, cooperative, and efficient mitigation of
Layer 7 attacks, in this work, we introduce a new approach
by leveraging the Protocol Independent Switch Architecture
(PISA) [9]. PISA allows us to program data planes directly
without involving a centralized controller by using parser
engines, match-action tables, ingress and egress pipelines in
P4 language [9]. More specifically, we design LAMP, Layer 7
Attack Mitigation with Programmable data planes. In LAMP,
we track the path of each flow coming into the victim network.
If an end host application detects an intrusion attempt, it
generates an attack alert by embedding a signal flag and
the attacker’s IP address in the IP option field of the reply
packet. We assume that such application has privileges to
modify IP packets’ fields of the alert message. The alert is sent
to the closest switch directly, which eventually forwards the
packet to the ingress switch that carried the original malicious
traffic. Upon receiving the alert, the ingress switch modifies
its flow control policy to block the subsequent traffic from
the attacker. Our new mitigation strategy yields at least three
advantages: (1) It enables network-wide cooperative detection
and mitigation of attacks. The detection results obtained by
one end host can be re-used to benefit services for the entire
network; (2) The volume of in-network malicious traffic is
considerably reduced, since the network edge quickly blocks
them; and (3) It enables lightweight and efficient network
operations compared to existing SDN approaches, where an
SDN controller is required to bridge the gap between appli-
cation and network layer services. In addition, SDN incurs
many additional messages, necessary to establish connections
between the SDN controller and end hosts. Overall, we made
the following contributions in this work:
(1) We designed LAMP, a new cooperative framework for
prompt and efficient mitigation of Layer 7 attacks without the
involvement of a centralized SDN controller;
(2) To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that we
designed a Layer 7 intrusion mitigation solution by leveraging
the new concept of programmable data planes;
(3) We implemented LAMP in P4 [9], the language for
programming the data plane of a switch. LAMP can re-use
the same P4 code for all the switches in a network for the
mitigation tasks.
(4) We emulated LAMP in the bmv2 model [10], a virtual
environment designed for testing P4-programmed switches.
Our comparison with a similar SDN architecture shows that
LAMP bears much less operational complexity and minimizes
the number of malicious application messages reaching end
hosts once an attack is detected.
II. RELATED WORK
In [15], Norman et al. studied application layer protocols
used in modern IoT devices and their vulnerabilities. De
Donno et al. in [2] presented a deep survey on DDoS
attacks against the IoT. Particularly, the authors analyzed
Mirai, an attack that was conducted using large number of
IoT devices, compromised with application layer dictionary
attacks and lured into the botnets. In [5], [7], [8], [6], the
authors proposed various Layer 7 attack detection techniques,
such as additional client tests (CAPTCHA, passwords, puzzles,
JavaScript authentication); web logs analysis and building a
profile of a legitimate user; analysis of the visiting history of
clients; traffic classification. LAMP is compatible with all of
these approaches since it is designed for fast mitigation of
attacks after they are detected by a member(s) of the network.
Giotis et al. in [16] presented an SDN architecture for
flow-based anomaly detection and installation of the mitigation
rules on the edge switches. The mitigation rules are dropping
the packets based on their source and destination IP addresses.
Lim et al. [17] design DDoS blocking solution that changes
the IP address of the victim and redirects the legitimate
connections, in order to mitigate large botnet attacks. In our
work, we present LAMP architecture, that blocks malicious
traffic at the edge switches using programmable data planes.
III. DESIGN
We demonstrate an example of Layer 7 attack mitigation
with LAMP on Figure 1. The attacker starts scanning resources
of the victim network in Figure 1(b), e.g., a random dictionary
attack in order to login into the most vulnerable end hosts.
Since the attack is conducted against the application layer,
the network layer devices, such as switches and routers, are
unable to detect it, and they allow the packets to reach the
end hosts. To track the entrance point of each external flow,
Switch 1 encapsulates its ID into the option field of the
incoming IP packet’s headers. The option is given a special
type INGRESS SWITCH INFO to differentiate it from other
possible options. Later, the switch ID and its option are
dumped as the last switch on the path forwards the packet
to the final destination. Meanwhile, that switch records the
mapping between the flow’s source IP address and the edge
(ingress) switch’s ID.
In our scenario, the end-host Server 2 detects the scanning
attempt and sends the attack alert message back into the
network (Figure 1(c)). The alert is encapsulated inside AT-
TACK ALERT option. The attack alert contains the IP source
address of the attacker. The switch (Switch 3) that receives
the alert finds the corresponding ingress switch (Switch 1),
adds the switch ID to the IP option, changes its type to
FORWARD and sends the packet to the next hop towards that
switch (Switch 1). Lastly, Switch 1 installs necessary entries
to drop the packets from the attacker before they enter the
network. To implement LAMP using the P4 language, we need
to program the following components over a programmable
data plane: (1) The parser; (2) Match-action tables; (3) Ingress
and egress flows of a switch. In the rest of this section, we
give the detailed description of our modifications in each of
those components.
A. Parser
To implement the parser, we first define (1) The headers that
should be decoupled and read from each packet; (2) The pos-
sible option numbers used in LAMP. We create 3 types of op-
tions with the following option numbers from the unassigned
range: ATTACK ALERT = 31; INGRESS SWITCH INFO =
29; FORWARD = 27.
In addition to Ethernet (ethernet t), IP (ipv4 t) and the
standard IP option header (ipv4 option t), we defined the
switch header (switch t) and the alert header (block t), that
shall contain the edge switch’s ID and attacker’s IP address re-
spectively. switch t and block t are placed within the payload
of ipv4 option t, so LAMP’s parser does not need to decouple
the Layer 4 (the Transport Layer) headers. In the meantime, for
the internal packets of a network, the parser will not decouple
switch t or block t headers, because those packets shall not
contain any of the above-mentioned IP options. Thus, we
exclude the additional overhead for the internal traffic, which
in some cases constitutes more than 75% of the total traffic
within a network [11]. LAMP’s parser’s state transitions are
illustrated on Figure 2.
B. Match-action tables
In LAMP, match-action tables are used for (1) Forwarding
the packets based on their IP destination address; (2) Adding
the edge switch’s ID to a packet that comes from outside the
network; (3) Removing the edge switch’s ID from a packet
whose next hop is an end host; (4) Forwarding the attack alert
based on the edge switch’s ID. While the tables’ structure and
actions are defined in the data plane, the content of the tables is
regulated by the control plane. We assume that the centralized
or a distributed control plane can automatically populate
match-action tables using API generated by P4 compiler.
(1) ipv4 lpm: As in the ”Simple Switch” presented by
P4 designers [12], table ipv4 lpm contains the prefixes and
the corresponding next hops (output port and MAC address
(a) Initial state
(b) Scanning the hosts of the
victim network by Attacker
(c) Server 2 detects the scanning
attempt and sends the alert
(d) Attack is blocked at the edge
Switch 1
Fig. 1: Scenario of Layer 7 attack mitigation with LAMP
Fig. 2: Parser in LAMP
information). The destination IP address of a packet will be
matched against one of those prefixes in order to get the next
hop. Based on the match, the packet is either forwarded (action
ipv4 forward) or dropped.
(2) swid add: Contains the mapping of the current switch’s
ID and the list of ports that connect the switch to an external
network. On receiving a packet from one of those ports, the
switch will attach its ID to the packet (action add swid).
In addition, the packet will be marked as ”to be checked”
using the packet’s metadata field (meta.check source ip=1).
The table is empty for internal switches.
(3) swid remove: Contains ports that connect to end hosts
and the option numbers we specified for Layer 7 attack
mitigation. LAMP needs to remove our previously attached
INGRESS SWITCH INFO option via remove swid action
from the packets that are reaching an end host at their next hop.
Meanwhile, the switch needs to store the mapping between the
attached ingress switch ID and the hashed value of the packet’s
source IP address. The table should be empty for switches that
are not directly connected to end hosts.
(4) swid forward: Contains the list of destination switch
IDs, the next hop ports and the corresponding MAC ad-
dresses in the network. This table may incur two different
actions based on the value of packet’s destination switch ID
hdr.switchID.swid: (a) If the value equals to the current switch
ID, run the action block, that will install a drop entry into
the blacklist hash table for the attached source IP address in
the alert message; (b) Otherwise, run the action ipv4 forward,
that will forward the packet to the next hop towards the
destination switch whose ID equals to hdr.switchID.swid. To
enable such workflow, the control plane needs to correctly
initialize swid forward table.
Fig. 3: Ingress pipeline in LAMP
Fig. 4: Evaluation scenario
C. Control flow
1) Ingress flow: After a packet is parsed (Figure 2), its
header fields are transmitted to the ingress pipeline as shown in
Figure 3. At first, LAMP checks the validity of the IP header.
If valid, the packet’s input port is matched against swid add
table. Two cases may happen: (1) If the port faces an external
network, the current switch ID is attached to the header option
of the packet. In addition, the packet’s source IP address
will be matched against the blacklist. If a match is found,
it indicates that this packet was from an attacker and LAMP
drops it; (2) Otherwise, the packet’s IP option is checked. If
there is an ATTACK ALERT option, the switch first finds the
corresponding ingress switch and adds its ID to the packet
header option. Then it changes the option to FORWARD and
forwards the packet towards that ingress switch. In case the
packet does not have above-mentioned options, it is matched
against ipv4 lpm table to obtain the next hop port and MAC
address. Lastly, the packet is matched against swid remove
table to remove option INGRESS SWITCH INFO if it exists
and the next hop for the packet is an end host.
Measurement
Architecture
LAMP SDN
Total 278 1288
Maximum 10 106
Minimum 5 5
Average 9 43
TABLE I: The number of invalid HTTP requests that
Server 1 received in SDN and LAMP architectures
2) Egress flow: For the egress flow, LAMP simply de-
parses the packet header in the following order: hdr.ethernet,
hdr.ipv4, hdr.ipv4 option, hdr.block, hdr.switchID. P4 program
automatically checks if each of these headers is valid and omits
the header if not. We omit P4 code listings ingress control flow
and the deparser due to the space constraints.
IV. EVALUATION
We emulated LAMP in the Behavioral Model (bmv2) [10],
which provides a P4 software switch with the compiler using
Mininet virtual environment [13]. We compared LAMP with
a similar architecture, implemented using SDN and Open-
Flow [14] in Mininet. The topology for the experiment is
similar to one illustrated on Figure 1. We used the following
scenario for the experiment (see Figure 4): At the moment
t0, the Attacker establishes TCP connection with Server 1
and Server 2; at t1, it starts sending packets with invalid
HTTP requests with a rate 200 packets/s. As soon as Server 2
detects the attack, it sends an alert message into the network
(t2). In case of LAMP, the message reaches the edge switch,
where a blocking entry is installed into the blacklist. In case
of SDN, the message is captured by an SDN controller, which
figures out the corresponding ingress switch and installs a
drop rule into its OpenFlow table. In our experiment, we
emulated 30 attacks for both LAMP and SDN architectures.
We intended to observe how many messages can go through
the network to reach the other victim before the attack can
be blocked. Interestingly, unlike LAMP, the SDN emulation
produced fluctuating results, as it can be seen in Table I.
Overall, in LAMP, Server 1 received only 278 invalid HTTP
requests, 1010 packets less than that received by Server 1 in
the SDN architecture. Moreover, the maximum number of such
requests during a single attack in LAMP is 10, while in SDN
it reached 106. But, in some cases, both LAMP and SDN
controller acted fast enough to block Attacker, so Server 1
received only 5 invalid HTTP requests. On average, in SDN,
Server 1 received 80% more invalid HTTP requests than that
in LAMP. We attribute it to the use of a centralized controller
that introduces additional overhead and complexity. In LAMP,
attack alerts are processed fully in the data plane, which makes
attack mitigation significantly faster. In the meantime, other
factors might have affected the performance of two emulated
architectures, such as the differences and deficiencies of P4
and SDN implementations in Mininet.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented LAMP, an architecture for
Layer 7 attack mitigation with programmable data planes. To
the best of our knowledge, for the first time we leveraged
Protocol Independent Switch Architecture (PISA) to design a
cooperative mitigation solution against the application layer
attacks. We presented the detailed solution of the new miti-
gation architecture in LAMP, including the modified parser,
match-action tables and the ingress flow. We implemented
LAMP in the P4 language and emulated it in the Mininet
virtual environment. Compared to a similar Software Defined
Networking architecture, LAMP mitigates the Layer 7 attacks
more quickly and minimizes the number of malicious appli-
cation layer messages that are sent to victims of the same
network.
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